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arXiv:2204.00713v4 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: As the widely applied method for measuring matching assortativeness in a transferable utility matching game, a matching maximum score estimation is proposed by \cite{fox2010qe}. This article reveals that combining unmatched agents, transfers, and individual rationality conditions with sufficiently large penalty terms makes it possible to identify the coefficient parameter of a single common constant, i.e., matching costs in the market.
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